There is great diversity in the size and nature of co-operatives. The emergence of multistakeholder primary co-operatives at the beginning of the 21st century with more than one membership group, such as consumers, employees, independent entrepreneurs and corporate (legal) persons as stakeholders, present new democratic challenges for their members. These co-operatives, which are not permitted in some national legislative systems, require specific arrangements in their rules or bylaws appropriate to their particular nature and function in order to apply this 2nd Principle of Democratic Member Control. In such co-operatives different relative weightings or proportions in voting rights may be appropriate for different categories of members.
Large and diverse co-operatives may inevitably need to consider, adapt and apply new structures for member democratic control in a way that is appropriate to the scale and structure of their co-operative. Whatever structures are created, there is a need to ensure that the essence of this 2nd Principle is respected. Without real and effective democratic member control an essential generic characteristic of our co-operative identity will be lost.
Similar democratic challenges arise in the multi-tiered democratic structures that have emerged in larger co-operatives. A key question is how do such large and complex co-operatives ensure that the democratic rights of all members to take part in board elections and influence strategic business decisions are protected and respected?
Some larger co-operatives with financial capacity have bought former investor-owned companies and are running them as subsidiaries, some in countries other than that in which the co-operative operates. This too raises challenges and questions about the maintenance of democratic member control and whether customers and/or employees of such subsidiaries should be enabled to be members.
There is no definite guidance on the maximum length of time a member may serve on an elected board or committee or in a particular elected position, save that setting maximum term limits for elected representatives is good governance practice. Some governance codes set term limits of three years before a representative must stand for re-election, with a maximum term limit of nine years. Others, including the Alliance, have longer maximum term limits: the longest term a person elected may serve on the Alliance Board is 18 years. National co-operative apex organisations may wish to set term limits in their own codes of governance and the Alliance may wish to issue further guidance on this matter in due course after consultation with members.